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STATE v. BABY: ONE STEP FORWARD FOR MARYLAND—
PROTECTING A WOMAN’S RIGHT TO WITHDRAW
CONSENT, BUT SENDING A CONFLICTING
MESSAGE TO APPELLATE COURTS
REVIEWING MULTIPLE-CONVICTION CASES
MICHELLE D. ALBERT*
In State v. Baby,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the
continuation of intercourse through force or threat of force after
withdrawal of consent may constitute rape, even if the intercourse began consensually.2 Finding that the trial court erred by failing to respond clearly to the jury on the effect of post-penetration withdrawal
of consent,3 the Court of Appeals reversed Maouloud Baby’s first degree rape conviction, first degree sexual offense conviction, and two
third degree sexual offense convictions, and remanded the case for
trial.4 By extensively analyzing whether to reverse Baby’s rape conviction, the Court of Appeals settled the confusion as to the significance
of its previous statement in Battle v. State5 on the subject of post-penetration withdrawal of consent.6 With its analysis of Baby’s rape conviction, the Court of Appeals seized the opportunity to declare that
Maryland law, in accordance with the weight of authority on this issue,
recognizes that forcibly continued intercourse after withdrawal of consent subsequent to penetration constitutes rape.7 However, because
the court did not conduct a comparable examination when deciding
whether to reverse Baby’s other convictions, ignoring several compelling arguments, the Court of Appeals improperly reversed Baby’s two
third degree sexual offense convictions and thus provided a confounding example for appellate courts.8
Copyright  2009 by Michelle D. Albert.
* Michelle D. Albert is a second-year student at the University of Maryland School of
Law, where she is a staff member for the Maryland Law Review. The author wishes to thank
Hannah Kon, Notes and Comments Editor, for her insightful feedback and encouragement, and Heather R. Pruger, Executive Notes and Comments Editor, for her meaningful
additions.
1. 404 Md. 220, 946 A.2d 463 (2008).
2. Id. at 260, 946 A.2d at 486.
3. Id. at 265–66, 946 A.2d at 489–90.
4. Id. at 223–24, 272, 946 A.2d at 465–66, 494.
5. 287 Md. 675, 414 A.2d 1266 (1980).
6. See infra Part IV.A.
7. See infra Part IV.B.
8. See infra Part IV.C.
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THE CASE

On December 13, 2003, J.L. and her best friend, Lacey, encountered a friend of Lacey’s younger brother, Maouloud Baby, at the McDonald’s restaurant in Montgomery Village.9 J.L. agreed to give Baby
and his friend, Mike, a ride.10 During the drive, at Baby’s request, J.L.
stopped at a residential development.11 Lacey left the group after
they returned to the McDonald’s, but gave J.L. her cell phone.12 J.L.
agreed to drive Baby and Mike to another residential development,
and once there, she complied with the boys’ request for her to move
to the back seat of the car so they could talk.13
J.L.’s and Baby’s versions of the events that evening diverged at
this point.14 According to J.L, after she moved to the back seat, Baby
“put his hand between her legs and Mike tried to put J.L.’s hand down
his pants.”15 When J.L. refused, Baby began fondling her breast.16
J.L. insisted that they return to the McDonald’s, but then agreed to
stay ten more minutes.17 J.L. “somehow ended up on [her] back” with
Baby trying to remove her jeans, while Mike attempted to put his penis in her mouth.18 J.L. asked them to stop, but Baby held her arms,
as Mike attempted to insert his penis into her vagina, “briefly inserting
his penis mistakenly into her rectum.”19 After Mike again unsuccessfully attempted intercourse with J.L., Baby put his fingers into her va9. Baby, 404 Md. at 225, 946 A.2d at 466. J.L. testified at trial that she was eighteen
years old and a student at Montgomery College at the time of the incident on December
13, 2003. Baby v. State, 172 Md. App. 588, 593, 916 A.2d 410, 413 (2007). Baby was sixteen
years old at the time of the incident, id. at 594, 916 A.2d at 413, and although J.L. recognized Baby from high school, she did not otherwise know him, Baby, 404 Md. at 225, 946
A.2d at 466.
10. Baby, 404 Md. at 225, 946 A.2d at 466. Specifically, J.L. agreed to drive Baby, Mike,
and an unidentified “Hispanic boy” to a party. Id. On the way to the party, Baby instructed
J.L. to stop at a gas station, where Baby and the Hispanic boy got out of the vehicle, but
only Baby returned. Id. Upon arriving at their destination, the group discovered that
there was no party, so J.L. drove back to the McDonald’s. Baby, 172 Md. App. at 594, 916
A.2d at 413; see also Baby, 404 Md. at 225, 946 A.2d at 466 (explaining that “Baby and Mike
decided not to attend the party”).
11. Baby, 404 Md. at 225, 946 A.2d at 466.
12. Id. at 226, 946 A.2d at 466.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 229, 946 A.2d at 468.
15. Id. at 226, 946 A.2d at 466–67.
16. Id., 946 A.2d at 467. Baby asked J.L. to “flash him” and Mike instructed her to “just
lick it.” Id.
17. Id.; Baby v. State, 172 Md. App. 588, 594, 916 A.2d 410, 413 (2007).
18. Baby, 404 Md. at 226, 946 A.2d at 467 (alteration in original); Baby, 172 Md. App. at
594, 916 A.2d at 413.
19. Baby, 404 Md. at 226, 946 A.2d at 467.
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gina.20 Baby then exited the car, and Mike inserted his penis into
J.L.’s vagina.21 After Mike left the vehicle, Baby reentered the car,
informing J.L. that it was his turn.22 After sitting together for a few
seconds, Baby asked J.L. if he could have sex with her, and said that he
did not want to rape her.23 J.L. consented “as long as he stop[ped]
when [she] t[old] him.”24 Baby climbed on top of J.L. and attempted
to put his penis into her vagina;25 however, this hurt J.L., so she yelled
for Baby to stop, but “he kept pushing it in.”26 Although J.L. pushed
Baby’s knees in an attempt to stop him, Baby did not stop for “[a]bout
five or so seconds.”27 J.L. called Lacey shortly thereafter.28
Baby’s account of the events that night was nearly identical to
J.L.’s version; however, Baby asserted that, prior to leaving Mike and
J.L. alone in the car, Baby did not touch, hold, grab, or have any contact with J.L.29 Baby’s account also differed with respect to what took
place once Mike departed and left Baby and J.L. alone in the car.30
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. According to J.L.’s testimony, Baby asked J.L. if she would “let [him] hit it.” Id.
Baby testified that this expression means to “[h]ave sex.” Id. at 230, 946 A.2d at 469.
When asked by the Assistant State’s Attorney at trial what she said in response to Baby’s
inquiry, J.L. testified that the boys had told her that she could leave as soon as they were
finished, which she took to mean that “[she] wouldn’t be able to leave until [she] was
done.” Id. at 226, 946 A.2d at 467.
24. Id. at 227, 946 A.2d at 467. J.L. testified that, at this moment, she “just wanted to go
home.” Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 227–28, 946 A.2d at 467. During the drive back to the McDonald’s, J.L. gave
Baby her phone number upon his request. Id. at 228, 946 A.2d at 468. Without J.L.’s
permission, Mike then drove them to a location across the street from the McDonald’s. Id.
28. Id. at 228, 946 A.2d at 468. As soon as Baby returned Lacey’s cell phone to J.L.,
which one of the boys had previously taken from J.L., J.L. called Lacey. Id. After Baby and
Mike left, J.L. picked Lacey up at the McDonald’s, and the girls went shopping with J.L.’s
mother and then to Lacey’s home, where J.L. told Lacey’s mother what had happened. Id.;
Baby v. State, 172 Md. App. 588, 596, 916 A.2d 410, 414 (2007). Before telling Lacey’s
mother what had happened, however, J.L. “responded in the negative to inquiries about
what was wrong from Lacey’s brother” at Lacey’s house. Baby, 172 Md. App. at 596, 916
A.2d at 414. The police were called after J.L. told Lacey’s mother. Baby, 404 Md. at 228,
946 A.2d at 468.
29. Baby, 404 Md. at 229, 946 A.2d at 468; see Baby, 172 Md. App. at 597, 916 A.2d at 415
(noting that Baby’s testimony was “surprisingly consistent” with J.L.’s explanation of the
events). Baby explained that, just as J.L. contended, after J.L. moved to the back seat, Mike
put her hand down his pants. Baby, 172 Md. App. at 598, 916 A.2d at 415.
30. Baby, 404 Md. at 229, 946 A.2d at 468. At trial, Baby testified that, after Mike left
the car, he told Baby that he had “just hit that.” Id. Baby also testified that when he got
back in the car, J.L. was only wearing her shirt, but that she otherwise appeared normal
and was not crying. Id. at 229–30, 946 A.2d at 468–69. Baby’s description of the brief
conversation that he had with J.L. after he entered the car was identical to J.L.’s account.
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Baby claimed that, after Baby and J.L. briefly conversed, “J.L. laid
down on the back seat.”31 Baby then tried to place his penis into J.L.’s
vagina, but “it wouldn’t go in.”32 Baby contended that J.L. did not ask
him to stop, but rather sat up and said “[i]t’s not going to go in,” after
which he stopped immediately.33
In December 2003, Baby was indicted for two counts of first degree rape, one count of first degree sexual offense, one count of attempted first degree sexual offense, one count of conspiracy to
commit first degree rape, and two counts of third degree sexual offense.34 Baby was initially tried on these charges in the Circuit Court
for Montgomery County, Maryland, but the court declared a mistrial
due to a hung jury.35 Baby was retried before a new jury four months
later.36
During the first day of deliberations, the new jury submitted three
notes to the court, the final one reading: “If a female consents to sex
initially and, during the course of the sex act to which she consented,
for whatever reason, she changes her mind and the man continues
until climax, does the result constitute rape?”37 Uncertain as to the
meaning of this question, the trial court informed the jury that the
court could not answer the question as posed, and directed the jury to
reread its instructions as to the elements.38 The next morning, the
jury submitted a fourth note: “If at any time the woman says stop is
that rape?”39 To this note, the court provided a similar answer, again
referring the jury to its original instructions.40
Compare id. at 226, 946 A.2d at 467 (quoting J.L.’s testimony in which she detailed her
conversation with Baby after he entered the car), with id. at 230, 946 A.2d at 469 (quoting
Baby’s testimony in which he described his conversation with J.L. after he entered the car).
Baby explained that he said “I’m not going to rape you” to confirm that he had permission.
Id.
31. Baby, 172 Md. App. at 598, 916 A.2d at 416.
32. Baby, 404 Md. at 231–32, 946 A.2d at 469.
33. Id. at 232, 946 A.2d at 470.
34. Id. at 223–24 & nn.1–4, 946 A.2d at 465–66 & nn.1–4.
35. Baby, 172 Md. App. at 593, 916 A.2d at 412.
36. Id.
37. Baby, 404 Md. at 233–34, 946 A.2d at 471. The jury’s first two notes read: “We’re
not close but would like to stay” and “Can we have until 10:30?” Baby, 172 Md. App. at 600,
916 A.2d at 416.
38. Baby, 404 Md. at 234, 946 A.2d at 471. Baby’s attorney argued at trial that the court
should have responded in the negative to this inquiry because the question indicated that
“the female in the note consented to penetration.” Id. at 235, 946 A.2d at 471.
39. Id. at 235, 946 A.2d at 472.
40. Id. In response to the fourth note, the trial court instructed the jury: “This is a
question that you as a jury must decide. I have given the legal definition of rape which
includes the definition of consent.” Id.
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The jury found Baby guilty of one count of first degree rape, one
count of first degree sexual assault, and two counts of third degree
sexual offense.41 Baby was sentenced to fifteen years of imprisonment, with all but five years suspended, and five years of probation.42
Baby noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland,43 presenting three issues: (1) did the trial court err by not providing Baby’s suggested supplemental instruction in response to the
jury’s inquiry on the issue of post-penetration withdrawal of consent;
(2) did the trial court err by denying Baby’s “request to remove a juror who indicated that he had read a newspaper article about the
case;” and (3) did the trial court err in denying Baby’s motion in
limine to exclude expert testimony on the subject of rape trauma syndrome.44 On the first issue, the Court of Special Appeals held that the
trial court erred by not answering the jury’s inquiries in the negative,
and thus reversed Baby’s convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings.45 Finding that the jury made explicit its difficulties,
the appellate court identified the “fair interpretation” of the jury’s
notes as an inquiry about the “legal effect of a withdrawal of consent
subsequent to penetration, and prior to climax.”46 The appellate court
explained that a trial judge is obliged to address a jury’s clearly
demonstrated difficulties with “‘concrete accuracy.’”47 It concluded
that the trial court should have provided the jury with a relevant statement of the law from Battle, as this statement represented a current
statement of Maryland law.48 The appellate court explained that Maryland must adhere to English common law principles, having
41. Id.
42. Baby, 172 Md. App. at 593, 916 A.2d at 413.
43. Baby, 404 Md. at 236, 946 A.2d at 472.
44. Baby, 172 Md. App. at 593, 916 A.2d at 413.
45. Id. at 593, 621, 916 A.2d at 413, 429.
46. Id. at 606, 916 A.2d at 420. The Court of Special Appeals rejected the State’s argument that the plain meaning of the jury’s question was ambiguous, and found that, even if
the third note’s wording was unclear, the fourth note, submitted the next morning, should
have clarified any such confusion. Id. at 605–06, 916 A.2d at 420.
47. Id. at 608, 916 A.2d at 421 (quoting Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607,
612–13 (1946)).
48. Id. at 617–18, 620–21, 916 A.2d at 427, 429. The Court of Special Appeals determined that the relevant language in Battle v. State was holding, not dicta, due to the extensive analysis that the Court of Appeals engaged in this case. Id. at 615, 916 A.2d at 425.
The Court of Special Appeals identified the relevant language from Battle v. State:
Given the fact that consent must precede penetration, it follows in our view that
although a woman may have consented to a sexual encounter, even to intercourse, if that consent is withdrawn prior to the act of penetration, then it cannot
be said that she has consented to sexual intercourse. On the other hand, ordinarily if she consents prior to penetration and withdraws the consent following penetration, there is no rape.
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adopted the common law,49 and that, under English common law, the
essence of the crime of rape was the act of penetration.50
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to decide
three issues: (1) if a woman withdraws consent after penetration, even
though she initially consented to vaginal intercourse, is she a victim of
rape if the intercourse continues against her will; (2) did the Court of
Special Appeals improperly reverse Baby’s first degree sexual offense
and third degree sexual offense convictions when these offenses were
unrelated to the subject matter of the jury’s inquiries; and (3) did the
trial court err in denying Baby’s motion in limine to exclude the expert
testimony on the subject of rape trauma syndrome.51

Id. at 614–15, 916 A.2d at 425 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Battle v. State,
287 Md. 675, 684, 414 A.2d 1266, 1270 (1980)). However, the appellate court noted that
the relevant question was not whether this statement from Battle was dicta or holding, but
rather whether this statement accurately represented Maryland law. Id. at 616, 916 A.2d at
425–26. The appellate court explained that whether this statement from Battle “should be
revisited in light of the weight of authority to the contrary is a matter for the Maryland
legislature or the Court of Appeals.” Id. at 621, 916 A.2d at 429 (footnote omitted). Until
then, the appellate court explained that the answer should be “no” to the question posed
in the jury’s third note: “If a female consents to sex initially and, during the course of the
sex act to which she consented, for whatever reason, she changes her mind and
the . . . man continues until climax, does the result constitute rape?” Id.
49. Id. at 617, 916 A.2d at 427 (explaining that common law “remains the law of the
Land until and unless changed by the State’s highest court or by statute”).
50. Id. Because rape was a common law crime in Maryland prior to its codification in
the Acts of 1976, the “present statutory requirement of ‘vaginal intercourse with another
person by force against the will and without the consent of the other person’ is an outgrowth of the definitions of rape at common law,” which the Court of Appeals set forth in
Hazel v. State. Id. at 611–12, 916 A.2d at 423 (quoting Battle, 287 Md. at 681, 414 A.2d at
1269). The appellate court explained that the English common law viewed the real harm
of rape as the injury of the man’s interest in the woman’s sexual and reproductive functions because, after the initial penetration, the man’s interest was damaged, as the woman
could not be “re-flowered.” Id. at 617, 916 A.2d at 427. The appellate court found that this
principle also undergirded the Battle holding. Id. at 616–17, 916 A.2d at 426–27. On the
second issue presented, the Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court properly
exercised its discretion in waiting to excuse the juror until the jury began its deliberations.
Id. at 627–28, 916 A.2d at 433. On the third issue, the court held that the trial court did
not err by denying Baby’s motion in limine and allowing Dr. Burgess’s testimony on the
subject of rape trauma syndrome. Id. at 632, 916 A.2d at 436.
51. State v. Baby, 404 Md. 220, 237–38 & n.10, 946 A.2d 463, 473 & n.10 (2008). The
State raised the first two issues in its Petition for Writ of Certiorari, while Baby presented
the third issue in a Conditional Cross-Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Id. at 237, 946 A.2d at
473. Baby raised an additional issue in his Conditional Cross-Petition, but the Court of
Appeals declined to address this issue because the court was remanding for a new trial on
other grounds. Id. at 237 n.10, 946 A.2d at 473 n.10.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Because rape was not codified in Maryland until 1976, Maryland
courts still use the common law to interpret the statutory definition of
rape, including the elements of rape, such as the element of consent.52 Courts typically consult and rely upon cases from other jurisdictions that have directly addressed this issue because few courts have
examined post-penetration withdrawal of consent.53 Courts most frequently address post-penetration withdrawal of consent in the context
of supplemental jury instructions; thus, any relevant inquiry into this
topic must include a discussion of the Maryland standards for determining whether an error in a criminal case warrants a reversal and for
evaluating whether a supplemental jury instruction is erroneous.54
A. Maryland Law on the Crime of Rape and the Withdrawal of
Consent
Prior to its codification in 1976, rape remained a common law
crime in Maryland.55 The Court of Appeals of Maryland defined the
common law crime of rape in Hazel v. State56 as the act of having “unlawful carnal knowledge” of a female older than ten years old through
force, without consent, and against the will of that female.57 The
Court of Appeals has explained that Maryland’s statutory crime of
rape58 was an outgrowth of the common law definition of rape recog52. See infra Part II.A.
53. See infra Part II.B.
54. See infra Part II.C.
55. Battle, 287 Md. at 680, 414 A.2d at 1269.
56. 221 Md. 464, 157 A.2d 922 (1960).
57. Id. at 468–69, 157 A.2d at 924.
58. The crime of first degree rape was first codified by Chapter 573 of the Acts of 1976.
Battle, 287 Md. at 680, 414 A.2d at 1269. When the court decided Battle, Section 462 of
Article 27 of the Maryland Code contained the statutory definition for the crime of rape.
Id., 414 A.2d at 1268. Adopted without substantive change from the former Article 27
definition, the present statutory definition of first degree rape reads as follows:
(a) A person may not: (1) engage in vaginal intercourse with another by force, or
the threat of force, without the consent of the other; and
(2)(i) employ or display a dangerous weapon, or a physical object that the victim
reasonably believes is a dangerous weapon;
(ii) suffocate, strangle, disfigure, or inflict serious physical injury on the victim or
another in the course of committing the crime;
(iii) threaten, or place the victim in fear, that the victim, or an individual known
to the victim, imminently will be subject to death, suffocation, strangulation, disfigurement, serious physical injury, or kidnapping;
(iv) commit the crime while aided and abetted by another; or
(v) commit the crime in connection with a burglary in the first, second, or third
degree.
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-303 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008).
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nized by Hazel.59 Consequently, Maryland courts use common law to
interpret terms from the definition of rape that the statute fails to
define, including the terms “force,” “threat of force,” and “without
consent.”60 The Court of Appeals has explained that these terms retain their “judicially determined meaning” as applied in common law
rape cases.61
In Hazel, the Court of Appeals described the element of consent,
explaining that “consent to the act at any time prior to penetration
deprives the subsequent intercourse of its criminal character.”62 However, the Court of Appeals did not address withdrawal of consent until
Battle v. State.63 In Battle, a 44-year-old woman agreed to drive John
Battle to his home and to examine a radio that Battle had hoped to
sell.64 The woman accepted Battle’s invitation to go upstairs to see the
radio because “he looked like a nice old man.”65 According to the
woman, Battle struck her, placed a screwdriver against her head, and
ordered her to disrobe.66 The woman complied out of fear, and Battle proceeded to effect penetration.67 Battle claimed that the woman
invited him to have intercourse with her, and that he found her naked
in his bedroom.68 Battle denied that any sexual contact occurred.69
During its deliberations, the jury submitted a written note to the
trial judge with the question: “When a possible consensual sexual relationship becomes non-consensual for some reason, during the course
of the action—can the act then be considered rape?”70 The trial
judge eventually affirmed that a situation that began consensually
could become non-consensual in the course of the event.71 In her
response, the trial judge also quoted the text from Hazel that described the element of consent and the differences between consent
and submission.72 Thereafter, the jury convicted Battle of assault with
intent to rape.73
59. Battle, 287 Md. at 681, 414 A.2d at 1269.
60. State v. Rusk, 289 Md. 230, 240, 424 A.2d 720, 725 (1981).
61. Id.
62. 221 Md. 464, 469, 157 A.2d 922, 925 (1960).
63. See 287 Md. at 676, 678, 414 A.2d at 1267–68 (analyzing a trial court’s response to a
jury’s inquiry on the issue of withdrawn consent in the context of rape).
64. Id. at 676–77, 414 A.2d at 1267.
65. Id. at 677, 414 A.2d at 1267.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 678, 414 A.2d at 1267.
69. Id.
70. Id., 414 A.2d at 1268.
71. Id. at 678–79, 414 A.2d at 1268.
72. Id. at 679, 414 A.2d at 1268.
73. Id. at 676, 414 A.2d at 1267.

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-4\MLR409.txt

2009]

unknown

STATE V. BABY

Seq: 9

17-JUN-09

11:53

1027

In analyzing whether the trial judge provided a proper response
to the jury’s inquiry, the Court of Appeals first examined the English
common law treatment of consent withdrawn after the act of intercourse, explaining that authorities unanimously held that consent after intercourse does not prevent the intercourse from qualifying as
rape.74 After observing that there was little case law on the effect of a
withdrawal of consent before penetration, the court quoted three foreign cases on this issue without explaining the significance of the
quoted text.75 The first case, decided in 1843, appeared to indicate
that the reason why a person consents is irrelevant.76 In the second
case, State v. Auld,77 the Supreme Court of New Jersey provided that
generally “‘[c]onsent must precede the penetration.’”78 The Supreme Court of Kansas in the third case, State v. Allen,79 explained
that, even though the “petting party” between the victim and the defendant began consensually, the fact that the victim withdrew consent,
advised the defendant, and then resisted his efforts was controlling.80
After directly quoting these three cases, the Battle court held that, because “consent must precede penetration,” a court cannot find that a
woman consented to intercourse if she withdrew consent prior to penetration, even if she initially consented to a “sexual encounter, even to
intercourse.”81 The court subsequently commented: “[o]n the other
hand, ordinarily if she consents prior to penetration and withdraws the
consent following penetration, there is no rape.”82 Because the jury’s
ambiguous question in combination with the trial judge’s ambiguous
clarification of and answers to that question created sufficient confu-

74. Id. at 681, 414 A.2d at 1269. In its brief discussion of the English common law
crime of rape, the Court of Appeals quoted commentary explaining the view that the crime
of rape was complete upon penetration. See id. (providing short excerpts from several legal
treatises covering the issue of consent subsequent to penetration).
75. See id. at 683–84, 414 A.2d at 1270 (incorporating, without additional analysis,
block quotations from decisions of the highest courts in Tennessee, New Jersey, and
Kansas).
76. See id. at 683, 414 A.2d at 1270 (“‘It is no difference if the person abused consented
through fear, or that she was a common prostitute, or that she assented after the fact, or
that she was taken first with her own consent, if she were afterwards forced against her
will.’ This charge is correct in every particular, and fully sustained by authority.” (quoting
Wright v. State, 23 Tenn. 194, 198 (1843))).
77. 67 A.2d 175 (N.J. 1949).
78. Battle, 287 Md. at 683, 414 A.2d at 1270 (quoting Auld, 67 A.2d at 180).
79. 183 P.2d 458 (Kan. 1947).
80. Id. at 684, 414 A.2d at 1270 (quoting Allen, 183 P.2d at 460).
81. Id.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
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sion, the court reversed Battle’s conviction and remanded the case for
a new trial.83
Prior to 2008, the Court of Appeals had not published any other
opinion addressing the issue of revoked consent in the context of
rape.
B. Status of the Law on Post-Penetration Withdrawal of Consent in
Other Jurisdictions
Although foreign cases are not binding, due to the novel nature
of the issue of post-penetration withdrawal of consent, courts addressing this topic frequently consult and rely on the analyses of courts in
other jurisdictions.84 Since 1979, eight states have judicially addressed
this issue,85 but only North Carolina has held that post-penetration
withdrawal of consent cannot result in a rape conviction.86 The other
seven states have held that forcibly continued intercourse subsequent
to revoked consent constitutes rape.87 Illinois has legislatively recognized that a person can withdraw consent at any time during intercourse, regardless of whether that person consented to the initial
penetration.88
In 1979, the Supreme Court of North Carolina became the first
court to address the issue of consent revoked subsequent to penetra83. Id. at 685, 414 A.2d at 1271. After its explanation of the law, the court expressly
concluded that “[t]he question and the answer here were confusing,” id. at 684, 414 A.2d
at 1270, but did not explain its reasoning for this conclusion. Instead, the court incorporated several direct quotations from Midgett v. State, 216 Md. 26, 139 A.2d 209 (1958),
before holding that this confusion warranted a reversal of Battle’s conviction. Id. at
684–85, 414 A.2d at 1270–71 (quoting Midgett, 216 Md. at 38, 41, 139 A.2d at 215, 217).
84. For examples of courts reviewing decisions from other jurisdictions on this issue,
see McGill v. State, 18 P.3d 77, 82–84 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001); State v. Siering, 644 A.2d 958,
963 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994); State v. Bunyard, 133 P.3d 14, 28–29 (Kan. 2006); State v.
Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067, 1070 (Me. 1985); State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 865 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995); State v. Jones, 521 N.W.2d 662, 672 (S.D. 1994).
85. E.g., McGill, 18 P.3d at 84; In re John Z., 60 P.3d 183, 184 (Cal. 2003); Siering, 644
A.2d at 963; Bunyard, 133 P.3d at 28; Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1070; Crims, 540 N.W.2d at 865;
State v. Way, 254 S.E.2d 760, 761 (N.C. 1979); Jones, 521 N.W.2d at 672.
86. See Way, 254 S.E.2d at 761–62 (holding that there cannot be a finding of rape if the
victim consented to the initial penetration).
87. E.g., McGill, 18 P.3d at 84; In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 184; Siering, 644 A.2d at 963;
Bunyard, 133 P.3d at 28; Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1069–70; Crims, 540 N.W.2d at 865; Jones, 521
N.W.2d at 672.
88. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12–17(c) (West 2002 & Supp. 2008) (“A person who
initially consents to sexual penetration or sexual conduct is not deemed to have consented
to any sexual penetration or sexual conduct that occurs after he or she withdraws consent
during the course of that sexual penetration or sexual conduct.”).
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tion in State v. Way.89 In Way, in response to the jury’s inquiry, the
trial court instructed the jury that a victim could withdraw “consent
initially given” and that the continuation of intercourse through force
or threat of force after the withdrawal of consent would constitute
rape.90 The Supreme Court of North Carolina found the trial court’s
instruction to be erroneous, and concluded that North Carolina law
precluded a finding of rape if the initial penetration occurred with
the victim’s consent.91
In 1985, Maine became the first state to hold that the continuation of intercourse after post-penetration withdrawal of consent constitutes rape.92 In State v. Robinson,93 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine evaluated whether the trial court properly responded to the
jury’s inquiry as to whether rape occurred when “two people began
consenting to an act, [but] then one person says no and the other
continues.”94 The trial court responded that there could be rape after
a withdrawal of consent subsequent to penetration, but emphasized
that the intercourse must continue under compulsion.95 The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that the trial court properly instructed the jury that the continuation of intercourse after withdrawal
of consent does not become rape merely as a result of the revoked
consent, but due to the compulsion that forces the continued intercourse.96 The court explained that “[p]ractical, common sense considerations” supported holding that continued penetration after
withdrawal of consent qualifies as “sexual intercourse” under Maine’s
rape statutory definition.97 The court expressly rejected the holding
89. 254 S.E.2d 760; see Nicole Burkholder Walsh, Comment, The Collusion of Consent,
Force, and Mens Rea in Withdrawal of Consent Rape Cases: The Failure of In re John Z., 26
WHITTIER L. REV. 225, 239 (2004) (explaining that “the issue of withdrawal of consent first
came to the attention of the nation” in the Way case before the Supreme Court of North
Carolina).
90. 254 S.E.2d at 761.
91. Id. at 761–62.
92. See Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1069–70 (holding that the “continued penetration of the
female sex organ by the male sex organ” after a withdrawal of consent subsequent to penetration constitutes rape); see also Matthew R. Lyon, Comment, No Means No?: Withdrawal of
Consent During Intercourse and the Continuing Evolution of the Definition of Rape, 95 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 277, 296 (2004) (“Maine was the first state to classify intercourse that continues after consent is withdrawn as rape.”).
93. 496 A.2d 1067.
94. Id. at 1069.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1070.
97. Id. at 1069–70. At the time of Robinson, Maine’s rape statute defined “sexual intercourse” as “‘any penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ.’” Id. at
1069–70 n.2 (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 251(1)(B) (1983), repealed by 1989
Me. Legis. Serv. 401 (West)). The court also justified its decision, explaining that “[i]n
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in Way because the Way court failed to cite any authority on point and,
more importantly, disregarded the crucial element of compulsion.98
The court rejected the position that there must be a withdrawal of the
male sex organ, however brief, for a rape conviction if intercourse
began consensually because this would shield from prosecution persons who used overwhelming force or “threat of serious bodily harm”
to prevent such a withdrawal.99 Therefore, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine affirmed that the trial court’s instruction stated the
law correctly.100
Since Robinson, six other state courts have upheld a woman’s right
to withdraw consent subsequent to penetration by holding that any
forced continuation of intercourse after a woman withdraws consent
constitutes rape: Connecticut, South Dakota, Minnesota, Alaska, California, and Kansas.101 In 1994, the Appellate Court of Connecticut
held in State v. Siering102 that the trial court properly instructed the
jury that a defendant is guilty of first degree sexual assault if he continues intercourse through use of force after the victim revokes her consent, even if the intercourse began consensually.103 The Connecticut
court concluded that the definition of “sexual intercourse” in Connecticut’s rape statute established that “‘[p]enetration, however
slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal intercourse’”104 and thus is not
limited to the initial penetration. Consequently, like the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, the Connecticut court held that penetration
continued through forcible compulsion after withdrawal of consent
constitutes rape.105
anybody’s everyday lexicon, the continued penetration of the female sex organ by the male
sex organ, after the time either party has withdrawn consent, is factually ‘sexual intercourse.’” Id. at 1069.
98. Id. at 1070; see State v. Way, 254 S.E.2d 760, 761–62 (N.C. 1979) (explaining that,
even though there can be no rape if the initial penetration was consensual, there is rape if
a particular act of intercourse was done without consent, so the concept of withdrawn
consent usually applies when there are multiple acts of intercourse).
99. Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1071.
100. Id. at 1071, 1073.
101. See infra notes 102–122 and accompanying text.
102. 644 A.2d 958 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994).
103. Id. at 961, 964.
104. Id. at 961–62 n.5 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-65(2) (1994)). The Connecticut court concluded that the legislature intended the statute to establish the minimum
amount of evidence necessary to prove intercourse. Id. at 962.
105. Id. at 963 (citing Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1069). However, the Connecticut court
explained that, because the Robinson court’s reasoning at least partly reflected the Maine
statute, which was not identical to the Connecticut rape statute, the Connecticut court had
to decide this issue of first impression based on its “own best judgment” of the state statute
“interpreted in the light of the common sense of the situation.” Id. The court rejected as
“archaic and unrealistic” the notion, upheld in State v. Way and People v. Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr.
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In State v. Jones,106 the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that
initial consent does not foreclose a rape prosecution under South Dakota law.107 The South Dakota Supreme Court held that the trial
court did not err by refusing to provide the defendant’s requested
jury instruction: “An act of sexual intercourse does not constitute
rape, where the female initially consents to the act, but after penetration, withdraws her consent, and the male, without interruption of
penetration, continues the act against the will of the female and by
means of force.”108
In 1995, in State v. Crims,109 the Court of Appeals of Minnesota
similarly held that rape includes forcible continuation of initially consensual intercourse because, unlike Way, Minnesota law defined “penetration both as the initial intrusion into the body of another and as
the act of sexual intercourse.”110 The Minnesota court thus held that
the trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury that initially
consensual intercourse cannot become rape.111
In 2001, in McGill v. State,112 the Court of Appeals of Alaska held
that Alaska statutes do not limit the scope of “sexual penetration” to
only the moment of initial penetration.113 The Alaska court thus held
that the trial court did not commit plain error by responding to the
jury’s note with the supplemental instruction that a woman may withdraw her initial consent to penetration, but that all of the elements of
first degree sexual assault must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt
to sustain a conviction for this crime.114 Agreeing with the Maine
161, 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), overruled by In re John Z., 60 P.3d 183 (Cal. 2003), that a man
cannot be guilty of rape if a woman initially consents to intercourse. Id. at 963; see also infra
note 117 (discussing Vela).
106. 521 N.W.2d 662 (S.D. 1994).
107. Id. at 672.
108. Id.
109. 540 N.W.2d 860 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
110. Id. at 865.
111. Id.
112. 18 P.3d 77 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
113. See id. at 84 (explaining that sexual penetration encompasses “a broader range of
conduct than [just] genital sexual intercourse” under Alaska law because the Alaska sexual
assault statute defines “sexual penetration” as including “genital intercourse, cunnilingus,
fellatio, and anal intercourse or an intrusion ‘however slight’ of an object or any part of a
person’s body into the genital or anal opening of another person’s body” (quoting ALASKA
STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(56) (2001) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(59)
(2006)))). Furthermore, the court found that nothing in the legislative history of the
Alaska statutes supported the proposition that a person cannot withdraw consent after penetration. Id.
114. Id. at 82, 84. Because the court found that the defendant did not preserve an
objection to the trial court’s instruction, the court explained that the defendant must
prove plain error to justify reversing his conviction. Id. at 82.
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court’s reasoning in Robinson, the court criticized the illogical result of
the contrary approach: allowing rape prosecution when a victim was
able to momentarily displace the male organ, but not when any withdrawal, however brief, was impossible because the victim was under
overwhelming “compulsion by physical force or threat of serious bodily harm.”115
In 2003, in In re John Z.,116 addressing a conflict between lower
appellate decisions, the Supreme Court of California held that “a withdrawal of consent effectively nullifies any earlier consent” and subjects
a person to forcible rape charges if that person forces continued
intercourse.117
In the same year, in State v. Bunyard,118 the Court of Appeals of
Kansas also held that a person may withdraw consent after penetration
during intercourse.119 Although the Kansas court consulted case law
from other jurisdictions, the court ultimately relied on statutory interpretation to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s rape conviction.120 The Kansas court found that
the statutory definition of “sexual intercourse” established a minimum
amount of contact necessary to prove intercourse, as the Kansas statute did not state that “the act of sexual intercourse ends with penetration.”121 Consequently, the court held that the continuation of
115. Id. at 84 (citing State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067, 1071 (Me. 1985)). The court
expressly dismissed the reasoning in State v. Way, Battle v. State, and People v. Vela as “not
persuasive,” and also criticized these decisions as representing “archaic and outmoded social conventions.” Id. at 82–84.
116. 60 P.3d 183 (Cal. 2003).
117. Id. at 184. With this holding, the Supreme Court of California expressly overruled
People v. Vela, instead agreeing with the reasoning of People v. Roundtree, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 921
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000). See In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 184 (comparing Vela and Roundtree).
Relying on reasoning from Way and Battle, the Court of Appeal for the Fifth District of
California held in Vela that “the presence or absence of consent at the moment of initial
penetration” determines whether the intercourse constitutes rape. People v. Vela, 218 Cal.
Rptr. 161, 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), overruled by In re John Z., 60 P.3d 183. In Vela, the court
defined the “essence of the crime of rape [as] . . . the outrage to the person and feelings of
the female resulting from the nonconsensual violation of her womanhood.” Id. at 165.
The Vela court justified its holding by finding that, when a man forcibly continues intercourse after a woman withdraws consent, a woman could hardly have the same magnitude
of outrage “as that resulting from an initial nonconsensual violation of her womanhood.”
Id. In Roundtree, the Court of Appeal for the First District of California declined to follow
Vela and instead adopted the Robinson view, holding that the forced continuation of intercourse against the victim’s will constitutes rape. Roundtree, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 924–25.
118. 75 P.3d 750 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 133 P.3d 14 (Kan. 2006).
119. Id. at 756.
120. See id. at 755–56 (discussing Battle, Siering, Robinson, and In re John Z., but then
making its decision based on statutory analysis).
121. Id. at 756.
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intercourse through “force or fear” after a participant withdraws consent constitutes rape.122
That same year, in 2003, Illinois became the first state to address
this issue legislatively, passing a statute that explicitly protects a person’s right to withdraw consent at any time during sexual intercourse.123 The Illinois statute provides that a “person who initially
consents to sexual penetration or sexual conduct is not deemed to
have consented to any sexual penetration or sexual conduct that occurs after he or she withdraws consent during the course of that sexual penetration or sexual conduct.”124
Aside from these states and two other state courts that have expressly declined to rule on the merits of the issue of post-penetration
withdrawal of consent,125 no other state has addressed this issue.
C. Maryland Standard for Determining if an Erroneous Jury Instruction
Warrants Reversal in a Criminal Case
Notably, seven of the eight states that have judicially addressed
post-penetration withdrawal of consent did so in the context of challenged supplemental jury instructions.126 Thus, any inquiry into this
topic must include a discussion of the Maryland standards for decid122. Id. Although the Supreme Court of Kansas ultimately reversed this decision because the trial court did not properly instruct the jury, the Supreme Court of Kansas maintained the position that, under Kansas law, “rape may occur after the initial penetration.”
State v. Bunyard, 133 P.3d 14, 28, 30–31 (Kan. 2006).
123. Act of July 25, 2003, Pub. Act 93-389, 2003 ILL. LAWS 2872 (codified at 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/12–17(c) (West Supp. 2008)).
124. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12–17(c).
125. See State v. Brodniak, 718 P.2d 322, 330 (Mont. 1986) (holding that the trial court
did not err by refusing to provide the instruction requested by the defendant, which was
based on State v. Way, but declining to address whether Way was the law in Montana); State
v. Crain, 946 P.2d 1095, 1102 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (“Although we do not rule on the
merits of the issue of withdrawal of consent under New Mexico law, we note that other
jurisdictions have questioned the legal validity of the proposition that there can be no rape
or CSP crime if the victim’s consent is withdrawn after penetration has begun.”).
126. See McGill v. State, 18 P.3d 77, 79 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001) (evaluating whether a trial
court’s instruction was erroneous); State v. Siering, 644 A.2d 958, 964 (Conn. App. Ct.
1994) (evaluating whether a trial court’s supplemental instruction was erroneous); Bunyard, 133 P.3d at 27 (same); State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067, 1070 (Me. 1985) (same);
State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 865 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (evaluating whether a trial
court’s refusal to provide a supplemental instruction was erroneous); State v. Way, 254
S.E.2d 760, 761 (N.C. 1979) (evaluating whether a trial court’s supplemental instruction
was erroneous); State v. Jones, 521 N.W.2d 662, 672 (S.D. 1994) (evaluating whether a trial
court’s refusal to provide a supplemental instruction was erroneous). The Supreme Court
of California heard a case on this issue not to examine an erroneous jury instruction, but
to settle a conflict between the intermediate California appellate courts. See In re John Z.,
60 P.3d 183, 184 (Cal. 2003) (explaining that the court had “granted this case to settle a
conflict in Court of Appeal decisions”).
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ing whether an error in a criminal case warrants a reversal and for
determining whether a supplemental jury instruction constitutes such
error.
Since 1976, Maryland courts have applied the Dorsey standard
when evaluating whether an erroneous jury instruction warrants a reversal in a criminal case.127 In Dorsey v. State,128 the Court of Appeals
articulated the Maryland standard for determining in criminal cases
whether an error of “constitutional significance or otherwise” is harmless or whether that error warrants a reversal.129 In Dorsey, the Court
of Appeals adopted the criteria enunciated by the Supreme Court of
the United States in Chapman v. California,130 as well as its application
by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Younie v. State,131 requiring
that Maryland courts reverse if the beneficiary of an error cannot
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that “the error in no way influenced the verdict.”132 Consequently, to deem an error harmless, a
reviewing court in Maryland must be satisfied, upon its own independent review of the record, that “there is no reasonable possibility that
the evidence complained of . . . may have contributed to the rendition
of the guilty verdict.”133 The Dorsey court justified this standard by
explaining that it would be illogical for appellate courts to apply a
127. See, e.g., Brogden v. State, 384 Md. 631, 639, 649–50, 866 A.2d 129, 134, 140 (2005)
(examining whether a trial court’s supplemental jury instruction constituted harmless error under the Dorsey standard); Heckstall v. State, 120 Md. App. 621, 629, 707 A.2d 953, 957
(1998) (same); see also Lovell v. State, 347 Md. 623, 660, 702 A.2d 261, 279 (1997) (examining whether a trial court’s decision not to provide a supplemental jury instruction constituted harmless error under the Dorsey standard).
128. 276 Md. 638, 350 A.2d 665 (1976).
129. Id. at 658–59, 350 A.2d at 678. The Court of Appeals adopted one uniform standard of review for all errors in criminal cases because there was “no sound reason for
drawing a distinction between the treatment of those errors which are of constitutional
dimension and those other evidentiary, or procedural, errors which may have been committed during a trial.” Id. at 657, 350 A.2d at 677.
130. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
131. 272 Md. 233, 322 A.2d 211 (1974).
132. Dorsey, 276 Md. at 648, 655, 659, 350 A.2d at 671, 675, 678 (citing Chapman, 386
U.S. at 24; Younie, 272 Md. at 246, 322 A.2d at 218). In Chapman, the Supreme Court held
that a court cannot find that a federal constitutional error is harmless unless the court can
declare that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 386 U.S. at 24. In reaching this holding, the Court explained that there was “little, if any, difference between . . .
[inquiring] whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of
might have contributed to the conviction and requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional
error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute
to the verdict obtained.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In Younie, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland adopted the Chapman standard to evaluate whether an error resulting
in a violation of a petitioner’s fundamental constitutional rights was harmless. 272 Md. at
246–47, 322 A.2d at 218.
133. Dorsey, 276 Md. at 659, 350 A.2d at 678.
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lesser evidentiary standard in criminal cases than trial courts, which
can sustain a criminal conviction only if it is supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.134
Under Maryland Rule 4-325(a), the decision to provide a supplemental jury instruction in a criminal case is within the discretion of
the trial court.135 In Lovell v. State,136 the Court of Appeals of Maryland evaluated whether a trial court abused its discretion by refusing
to provide a supplemental instruction regarding the mitigating circumstance of “youthful age,” as set forth in Maryland’s death penalty
statute, after the jury submitted a note inquiring about this issue.137
In determining whether this refusal constituted error, the Court of
Appeals relied extensively on the Supreme Court decision Bollenbach
v. United States,138 which held that when a jury clearly demonstrates its
difficulties, the trial judge should address the jury’s confusion with
“‘concrete accuracy.’”139 The Lovell court, relying on a United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit opinion, then explained that
when a jury explicitly expresses a specific difficulty relating to a central question of the case, a helpful response from the trial court is
mandatory.140 Thus, Maryland courts are obligated to respond helpfully to resolve the jury’s expressed confusion.141 Because the jury’s
note indicated that at least one juror was sufficiently concerned about
the “youthful age” mitigating circumstance and sought clarification,
the Court of Appeals held that in this case the trial court erred by not
providing a supplemental instruction.142 Furthermore, the Lovell
court held that the trial court’s decision did not constitute harmless
error because it took only one unconvinced juror to prevent a death
sentence.143

134. Id. at 658, 359 A.2d at 677–78 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).
135. Lovell v. State, 347 Md. 623, 657, 702 A.2d 261, 278 (1997) (citing MD. R. 4325(a)).
136. 347 Md. 623, 702 A.2d 261 (1997).
137. Id. at 653, 702 A.2d at 276.
138. 326 U.S. 607 (1946).
139. See Lovell, 347 Md. at 658, 702 A.2d at 278 (quoting Bollenbach, 326 U.S. at 613)
(extensively reviewing and placing significant weight on Bollenbach).
140. Id. at 659, 702 A.2d at 279 (quoting Price v. Glosson Motor Lines, Inc., 509 F.2d
1033, 1037 (4th Cir. 1975)).
141. See id. at 658–59, 702 A.2d at 278–79 (explaining the importance of resolving the
jury’s confusion).
142. Id. at 659–60, 702 A.2d at 279.
143. Id. at 660, 702 A.2d at 279.
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THE COURT’S REASONING

In State v. Baby, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the
crime of first degree rape includes the continuation of vaginal intercourse “through force or threat of force and without the consent of
the victim, even if the victim consented to the initial penetration.”144
The Court of Appeals vacated the judgments of the Court of Special
Appeals and the Circuit Court for Montgomery County and remanded
the case for a new trial, but issued multiple opinions to address the
three issues on which the court granted certiorari.145 On the first issue presented, Judge Battaglia, writing for the majority, held that the
trial court erred by not providing a more specific response to the
jury’s inquiry regarding the effect of post-penetration withdrawal of
consent.146 The majority extensively reviewed Battle v. State in order to
discern whether the following statement from Battle, upon which the
Court of Special Appeals relied, was dicta or holding:147 “‘ordinarily if
she consents prior to penetration and withdraws the consent following
penetration, there is no rape.’”148 The majority held that this statement was obiter dictum not entitled to precedential weight because the
statement was a collateral statement, “not made on a point that was
argued by counsel and deliberately addressed by this Court,” and because the decision in Battle did not depend on the statement.149
Moreover, the majority found this statement to be dicta because it
merely articulated the converse of the holding in Battle, as the Battle
court did not subject this statement to any additional analysis.150
The majority then concluded that, even if the English common
law crime of rape was derived from the concept of “de-flowering” virgins, before Maryland adopted the English common law, “the English
law of rape had evolved beyond the [ancient] understanding of rape
144. 404 Md. 220, 223, 946 A.2d 463, 465 (2008).
145. Id. at 272, 946 A.2d at 494. Judge Battaglia wrote the majority opinion: Part I,
joined by Judges Harrell, Greene, and Cathell, addressed the first issue; Part II, joined by
Chief Judge Bell and Judges Greene and Cathell, decided the second issue; and the Court
of Appeals issued a unanimous opinion on the third issue. Id. at 222–23, 946 A.2d at
464–65.
146. Id. at 223, 946 A.2d at 465.
147. See id. at 241–45, 946 A.2d at 475–77 (explaining the court’s conclusions and reasoning in Baby).
148. Id. at 244, 946 A.2d at 477 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Battle v. State, 287 Md.
675, 684, 414 A.2d 1266, 1270 (1980)).
149. Id. at 246, 946 A.2d at 478. The Court of Appeals concluded that the decision in
Battle did not depend on this statement because, if the statement were removed, the decision would remain unaffected. Id.
150. Id.
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as merely a trespass upon a man’s property.”151 As support for its conclusion that the English law of rape at the time of its adoption by
Maryland in the seventeenth century no longer viewed “the harm
done through rape [as] fully accomplished upon penetration,”152 the
court examined the writings of various early English commentators.153
The court then examined early post-Revolution American cases that
addressed withdrawal of consent, and found that only two of these
cases contained any support for Baby’s position, and that the language
in both cases was arguably dicta.154 The court reviewed modern cases
in which other state courts had considered whether post-penetration
withdrawal of consent could result in rape and dismissed the single
case that had held that the withdrawal of consent after initially consensual penetration could not result in rape, on the basis of its lack of
analysis.155 Persuaded instead by the analyses conducted by the
Maine, Kansas, and Connecticut appellate courts,156 the court concluded that Maryland’s rape statute also “punishes the act of penetration, which persists after the withdrawal of consent.”157 The court
thus concluded that the weight of authority supported a finding that
any continuation of penetration by force or threat of force after a woman withdraws consent could constitute rape.158
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower appellate
court’s reversal of Baby’s rape conviction because the trial court
should have directly responded to the jury’s confusion as to the effect
of a post-penetration withdrawal of consent.159 The court explained
that when a deliberating jury submits a question involving a central
issue of the case, the trial court must provide a response that resolves
151. Id. at 248–49, 946 A.2d at 479–80.
152. Id. at 252, 946 A.2d at 482.
153. See id. at 249–52, 946 A.2d at 480–82 (drawing upon Bracton’s thirteenth-century
treatise, On the Laws and Customs of England; the writings of Sir Matthew Hale, including
This History of the Pleas of the Crown; and Sir William Backstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of
England). The court explained that “Hale and Blackstone wrote before the time of American independence, and Bracton’s writings and Lord Audley’s Case occurred before the
founding of Maryland.” Id. at 252, 946 A.2d at 482.
154. See id. at 253–55, 946 A.2d at 482–83 (examining Wright v. State and citing many
other early American cases on this issue).
155. See id. at 255, 946 A.2d at 483–84 (discussing Way and finding this decision to be
unpersuasive).
156. See id. at 255–59, 946 A.2d at 484–86 (discussing decisions by those courts in Robinson, Bunyard, and Siering, respectively).
157. Id. at 259, 946 A.2d at 486.
158. Id. at 260, 946 A.2d at 486. The Court of Appeals did, however, emphasize that
force or threat of force remains an essential element of the crime of rape. Id. (citing Hazel
v. State, 221 Md. 464, 469, 157 A.2d 922, 925 (1960)).
159. Id. at 263–64, 946 A.2d at 488–89.
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the jury’s confusion.160 The court concluded that the jury’s inquiries
about the effect of a post-penetration withdrawal of consent certainly
related to a central issue.161 Because the court could not conclude
that the trial court’s error in not providing a more specific response
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the court reversed Baby’s
rape conviction.162
On the second issue, the Court of Appeals held that Baby’s convictions for first degree sexual offense and third degree sexual offense
should also be reversed.163 The majority concluded that a further instruction on the effect of post-penetration withdrawal of consent may
have altered the jury’s verdict on Baby’s first degree and third degree
sexual offense charges, as “[l]ack of consent” is an element of rape as
well as of first and third degree sexual offense charges.164
Judge Raker concurred in part and dissented in part.165 Judge
Raker concurred in the judgment of the majority’s opinion on the
first issue presented, reversing Baby’s rape conviction; however, unlike
the majority, she believed that the statement from Battle was holding,
not dicta.166 Judge Raker noted that whether the Battle statement was
dicta or holding “becomes highly significant at any retrial” for several
reasons.167 If the Battle statement was dicta and did not “stat[e] new
law or chang[e] the law of rape in Maryland,” she explained, “at any
retrial, the court should instruct the jury that post-penetration with160. Id. at 263, 946 A.2d at 488 (citing Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612–13
(1946); Lovell v. State, 347 Md. 623, 658–59, 702 A.2d 261, 278–79 (1997)).
161. Id., 946 A.2d at 488–89.
162. Id. at 265, 946 A.2d at 489 (citing Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665,
678 (1976)).
163. Id. at 241, 946 A.2d at 475.
164. Id. at 266, 946 A.2d at 490. On the third issue, the Court of Appeals issued a unanimous opinion, suggesting that courts should subject evidence regarding “rape trauma syndrome” to Frye-Reed analysis. Id. at 241, 946 A.2d at 475. Although the court did not need
to address whether Baby interposed an appropriate objection, the court provided guidance
to the circuit court, explaining that the court has “reaffirmed the importance of Frye-Reed
analysis in determining the validity and reliability of a wide variety of scientific methodologies and conclusions, including various syndromes.” Id. at 266, 270, 946 A.2d at 490,
492–93. In Reed v. State, the Court of Appeals adopted the Frye standard as the threshold
standard governing the admissibility of scientific evidence. 283 Md. 374, 389, 391 A.2d
364, 372 (1978). The Frye standard evaluates the validity and the reliability of a scientific
principle or methodology by examining the “‘general acceptance’” of the principle or
methodology in the relevant scientific community. Id. at 381, 391 A.2d at 368 (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
165. Baby, 404 Md. at 272, 946 A.2d at 494 (Raker, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Chief Judge Bell and Judge Wilner joined Part I of Judge Raker’s opinion, while
Judges Harrell and Wilner joined Part II of Judge Raker’s opinion. Id.
166. Id. at 272–73, 946 A.2d at 494.
167. Id. at 274, 946 A.2d at 495.
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drawal of consent may constitute rape.”168 However, if the Battle statement was a holding that announced a new rule of law, at any retrial,
the court should instruct the jury that there can be no rape if a woman consents to intercourse before penetration, as any new rule of
law may be applied only prospectively.169 Judge Raker ultimately concluded that the statement from Battle was a holding because it was
“hardly a ‘by the way’ statement,” as it “was directly involved in the
issues raised in the case.”170 Therefore, Judge Raker ended Part I of
her opinion by explaining that the “trial court should have instructed
the jury in the language of Battle.”171
Judge Raker dissented from the majority’s “bald conclusion” on
the second issue, instead concluding that the court should have affirmed Baby’s convictions of first and third degree sexual offense.172
Decisively, Judge Raker noted that Baby’s sexual offense charges were
unrelated to the jury’s questions and arose from “separate and discrete acts, that of aiding and abetting Mike in an act of anal penetration and the touching of J.L.’s breasts and vagina without her consent,
which are entirely unrelated to the issue of post-penetration withdrawal of consent during the separate act of sexual intercourse.”173
IV.

ANALYSIS

By thoroughly analyzing the issue of whether to reverse Baby’s
rape conviction, examining both English and Maryland common law,
the Court of Appeals eliminated any confusion that had developed in
the legal community as to the significance of the statement from Battle
on the subject of post-penetration withdrawal of consent.174 Consulting jurisprudence from other states, the court firmly declared that Maryland law, in accordance with the weight of authority on the issue,
recognizes that the continuation of intercourse through force or
threat of force after a withdrawal of consent subsequent to penetration can constitute rape.175 However, because the court failed to con168. Id. at 275, 946 A.2d at 495.
169. Id. (citing Walker v. State, 343 Md. 629, 637–40, 684 A.2d 429, 432–33 (1996)).
170. Id. at 280, 946 A.2d at 498. In addition, Judge Raker found it compelling that this
issue was raised and argued in the Appellant’s brief in the Battle case. See id., 946 A.2d at
499 (citing Brief of Appellant at 6, Battle v. State, 287 Md. 675, 414 A.2d 1266 (1980) (No.
159)).
171. Id., 946 A.2d at 499.
172. Id. at 281, 946 A.2d at 499.
173. Id. Judge Raker also found that “the absence of any evidence of the victim consenting to Mike’s acts makes the Court’s ipse dixit conclusion . . . too great a leap.” Id. at
281–82, 946 A.2d at 499.
174. See infra Part IV.A.
175. See infra Part IV.B.

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-4\MLR409.txt

1040

unknown

Seq: 22

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

17-JUN-09

11:53

[VOL. 68:1019

duct a comparable examination when deciding whether to reverse
Baby’s other convictions, ignoring several compelling arguments and
conducting a hasty analysis of the issues, the Court of Appeals improperly reversed Baby’s two third degree sexual offense convictions and
thus established a confounding example for appellate courts.176
A. Through a Thorough Analysis of Whether to Reverse Baby’s Rape
Conviction, the Court of Appeals Thwarted Any Confusion that
Had Developed as to the Significance of the Statement
from Battle on the Subject of Post-Penetration
Withdrawal of Consent
In the years following the 1980 Battle opinion, substantial confusion arose as to the significance of this opinion, as evidenced by law
journal articles and court opinions from other jurisdictions.177 Although Battle left little ambiguity with regard to Maryland’s position
on the effect of pre-penetration withdrawal of consent,178 the subsequent statement in Battle did not clearly define the effect of post-penetration withdrawal of consent, and instead generally observed that
“ordinarily if [a woman] consents prior to penetration and withdraws
the consent following penetration, there is no rape.”179 This statement in Battle regarding the ordinary implication of post-penetration
withdrawal of consent created substantial confusion as to its significance. Tending to ignore the word “ordinarily” in this statement,
many law journals cited Battle as holding that Maryland law precludes
a finding of rape when a woman withdraws consent after penetration,
even if intercourse is forcibly continued thereafter.180
176. See infra Part IV.C.
177. See infra text accompanying notes 180–184.
178. See Battle v. State, 287 Md. 675, 684, 414 A.2d 1266, 1270 (1980) (“Given the fact
that consent must precede penetration, it follows in our view that although a woman may
have consented to a sexual encounter, even to intercourse, if that consent is withdrawn
prior to the act of penetration, then it cannot be said that she has consented to sexual
intercourse.”).
179. Id.; see also supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text (explaining that, after the
Battle court’s holding, the court commented that ordinarily no rape occurs when consent is
withdrawn after penetration).
180. See, e.g., Amanda O. Davis, Comment, Clarifying the Issue of Consent: The Evolution of
Post-Penetration Rape Law, 34 STETSON L. REV. 729, 734–35 (2005) (“According to Battle, if
the victim gives consent at the moment of penetration, then no rape can occur even if he
or she revokes that consent.”); Lyon, supra note 92, at 294 (“Thus, the court [in Battle]
concluded that if a woman consents to intercourse prior to penetration, and then withdraws her consent, no rape has occurred.”); Erin G. Palmer, Recent Development, Antiquated Notions of Womanhood and the Myth of the Unstoppable Male: Why Post-Penetration Rape
Should be a Crime in North Carolina, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1258, 1260 n.19 (2004) (citing to Battle
as “holding that if a woman withdraws consent following penetration, a man’s failure to
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Divergent interpretations by state courts further demonstrate the
confusion caused by this second statement in Battle on the subject of
post-penetration withdrawal of consent. The Appellate Court of Connecticut in State v. Siering interpreted the statement as being “arguably
dicta.”181 However, other courts concluded that the language indicated that the Battle court reached the same conclusion as the Supreme Court of North Carolina did in State v. Way, that postpenetration withdrawal of consent cannot result in rape if intercourse
began consensually.182 Courts in other jurisdictions have also accorded the Battle statement varying degrees of authority. Some courts
granted the Battle language little to no weight because the court did
not provide any analysis or cite any authority,183 while one court relied
on this language to justify holding that rape cannot occur in withdrawn consent scenarios.184 Through an in-depth examination of its
decision in Battle, the Court of Appeals in Baby quieted all of this confusion by concluding that the language in Battle pertaining to postpenetration withdrawal of consent was only obiter dictum because it ap-

cease intercourse is not rape”); Walsh, supra note 89, at 241 (“The court in Maryland, as in
North Carolina, retained the ‘bright-line’ rule that, after penetration has occurred, withdrawal of consent will not suffice to establish that a rape has occurred, even [sic] the withdrawal of consent is accompanied by force or threats.”); Note, Acquaintance Rape and Degrees
of Consent: “No” Means “No,” but What Does “Yes” Mean?, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2341, 2356 (2004)
(“Courts in three states—Maryland, North Carolina, and California—have explicitly rejected the idea that a woman can withdraw consent after penetration . . . . The court [in
Battle] surmised that if a woman consents prior to penetration and withdraws the consent
after penetration, there is no rape.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
181. 644 A.2d 958, 963 n.8 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994).
182. See McGill v. State, 18 P.3d 77, 82–83 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001) (explaining that the
court in Battle “reached the same result as in Way,” which held that “if consent to sexual
intercourse is withdrawn after sexual penetration, that fact pattern cannot sustain a conviction for rape”); People v. Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. 161, 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (explaining
that the “same conclusion was reached” in Way as in Battle), overruled by In re John Z., 60
P.3d 183 (Cal. 2003); State v. Bunyard, 133 P.3d 14, 28 (Kan. 2006) (explaining that “Maryland [in Battle] and North Carolina [in Way] have concluded that . . . [i]f consent is withdrawn after the initial penetration, the defendant cannot be convicted of rape even if the
sexual acts are continued against the victim’s will by force or fear”); State v. Crims, 540
N.W.2d 860, 865 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (explaining that Battle arrived “at [the] same determination [as Way] because [the] statute merely codifies common law”).
183. See McGill, 18 P.3d at 83–84 (noting that the court in Battle reached its conclusion
“without citing authority,” and therefore declining to adopt the conclusion from Battle);
Bunyard, 133 P.3d at 28 (declining to follow the position articulated in Battle because the
court did not “provide any analysis or citation to authority to support” its conclusion).
184. See Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 163–65 (referring to Battle and holding that there cannot
be rape if the initial penetration was consensual, even if there was a withdrawal of consent
subsequent to penetration).
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peared after the Battle court’s holding and was independent of the
holding.185
The Baby court provided several justifications for its finding that
this language from Battle was only dictum. First, the Baby court identified the statement as a collateral statement and thus dictum because
the court did not make the statement on a point “argued by counsel
and deliberately addressed by [the c]ourt.”186 Second, the Baby court
noted that the statement was not essential to the holding, as the holding would remain unaffected even if this language was removed.187
Finally, the Baby court concluded that this statement was dictum because it appeared to be an “articulation of the converse” of the previous statement in Battle and was not subjected to any additional
analysis.188
The Baby court also clarified the scope of its Battle decision by
explaining that the “sole issue” before the court in Battle was “whether
withdrawal of consent before penetration, followed by vaginal intercourse accomplished through force or threat of force, constituted
rape.”189 By addressing both the significance of the Battle statement
and clearly defining the scope of the Battle decision, the Baby court
put an end to inconsistent interpretations of Battle.190
B. In Baby, the Court of Appeals Also Seized the Opportunity to Declare
that Maryland Law, in Accordance with the Weight of
Authority, Recognizes that Forcibly Continued Intercourse
After Withdrawal of Consent Subsequent to
Penetration Can Constitute Rape
In addition to clarifying the significance of Battle, the Court of
Appeals in Baby established that Maryland law, in accordance with the
weight of authority, punishes penetration that continues after a with185. See State v. Baby, 404 Md. 220, 244–47, 946 A.2d 463, 477–78 (2008) (citing Battle v.
State, 287 Md. 675, 684, 414 A.2d 1266, 1270 (1980)) (extensively reviewing the court’s
decision in Battle and providing multiple reasons for its conclusion that the relevant language was only obiter dictum).
186. Id. at 246, 946 A.2d at 478.
187. See id. (“[The] decision in Battle was not dependent upon this statement; the holding would indeed be unaffected were that language to be removed.”).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 247, 946 A.2d at 478.
190. See supra note 180 (identifying the law journals that interpreted Battle as holding
that a post-penetration withdrawal of consent could not result in rape, which the Baby
court explained was not the case); supra note 182 (identifying the court opinions that
interpreted Battle as reaching the same holding as Way, which the Court of Appeals explained was not the case).
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drawal of consent.191 Prior to the Baby ruling, most states had not
explicitly addressed the issue of post-penetration withdrawal of consent.192 Of the eight states that had judicially addressed this issue
prior to 2008, only North Carolina failed to recognize that rape can
occur after a post-penetration withdrawal of consent when the act of
intercourse began consensually.193 One state legislatively addressed
post-penetration withdrawal of consent by passing a statute that expressly protects a person’s right to withdraw consent at any time during sexual intercourse.194 Therefore, prior to Baby, eight states had
adopted the position that a person can withdraw consent after penetration and that any forcible continuation of intercourse thereafter
constitutes rape.195
By using Baby to address directly post-penetration withdrawal of
consent, the Court of Appeals seized the opportunity to declare the
status of Maryland law on this issue, engaging in a thorough examination of the authority of other states that had directly considered this
issue.196 In accordance with the many state courts that had rejected
the Way approach, the Baby court expressly found that the Way decision was not persuasive due to its lack of analysis and support.197 In191. Baby, 404 Md. at 259, 946 A.2d at 486.
192. See Davis, supra note 180, at 744 (explaining that the majority of states have not
addressed the issue of post-penetration rape); Lyon, supra note 92, at 296 (same).
193. Compare State v. Way, 254 S.E.2d 760, 761–62 (N.C. 1979) (holding that post-penetration withdrawal of consent cannot result in a rape conviction), with McGill v. State, 18
P.3d 77, 84 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001) (holding that forcibly continued intercourse subsequent to post-penetration withdrawal of consent constitutes rape), In re John Z., 60 P.3d
183, 184 (Cal. 2003) (same), State v. Siering, 644 A.2d 958, 963 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994)
(same), State v. Bunyard, 133 P.3d 14, 28 (Kan. 2006) (same), State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d
1067, 1070 (Me. 1985) (same), State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 865 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)
(same), and State v. Jones, 521 N.W.2d 662, 672 (S.D. 1994) (same).
194. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12–17(c) (2008) (setting forth Illinois’s statutory law
with respect to withdrawal of consent).
195. Illinois, Alaska, California, Connecticut, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, and South Dakota adopted this position prior to Baby. To review the context in which these states
adopted this rule, respectively, see id.; McGill, 18 P.3d at 84; In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 184;
Siering, 644 A.2d at 963; Bunyard, 133 P.3d at 28; Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1070; Crims, 540
N.W.2d at 865; Jones, 521 N.W.2d at 672. In 2006, the Supreme Court of Kansas acknowledged that the majority of states that had addressed this issue had recognized that the
crime of rape included the continuation of intercourse through force or threat of force
after a withdrawal of consent subsequent to penetration. Bunyard, 133 P.3d at 28.
196. See Baby, 404 Md. at 255, 946 A.2d at 483 (beginning its review of the decisions from
states that have directly considered the issue of post-penetration withdrawal of consent in
“more recent years”).
197. Id., 946 A.2d at 484; see also McGill, 18 P.3d at 83–84 (declining to follow the decision in Way and noting that the Way court made its decision “without explanation or citation to authority”); Siering, 644 A.2d at 963 (“Th[e] decision [in Way] is not persuasive
because it contains no analysis or explanation but is merely a bald statement that the trial
court was wrong.”); Bunyard, 133 P.3d at 28 (declining to follow the decision in Way and
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stead, the Baby court found the decisions of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine in Robinson, the Court of Appeals of Kansas in Bunyard, and the Appellate Court of Connecticut in Siering to be persuasive.198 The Baby court adopted the modern position, concluding that
allowing “the act of penetration [to effectively] end[ ] the act of sexual intercourse would lead to absurd results not contemplated by the
drafters of [the Maryland] rape statute.”199 Through its analysis, the
Court of Appeals firmly declared that, under Maryland law, the crime
of rape includes forcibly continued vaginal intercourse after a withdrawal of consent subsequent to penetration.200 Thus, the Court of
Appeals effectively took a step forward for Maryland by formally declining to follow the outdated and archaic position represented by
Way,201 and by clarifying Maryland law on this issue.202
C. The Court of Appeals Conducted a Hasty Examination in Deciding
Whether to Reverse Baby’s Other Convictions, Which Resulted
in an Improper Reversal of Baby’s Third Degree Sexual
Offense Convictions and Established an Inconsistent
Example for Appellate Courts
Despite the court’s comprehensive twenty-four-page analysis of
whether to reverse Baby’s rape conviction, the Court of Appeals failed
to engage in a comparable examination of Baby’s other convictions.
noting that the Way court made its decision without providing “any analysis or citation to
authority to support [its] conclusions”); Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1070 (rejecting the Way decision because the “court did not cite any authority on point” and misstated the jury instruction at issue).
198. Baby, 404 Md. at 259, 946 A.2d at 486.
199. Id. As further evidence of its concurrence with this modern view, the Baby court
cited to other state courts that have recognized that there can be rape when a defendant
forcibly continues intercourse after a withdrawal of consent subsequent to penetration. Id.
at 259 n.22, 946 A.2d at 486 n.22 (citing McGill, 18 P.3d at 84; In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 185;
Maddox v. State, 317 S.E.2d 658, 659 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984); Crims, 540 N.W.2d at 865; Jones,
521 N.W.2d at 672). Moreover, by finding that English common law at the time of Maryland’s adoption no longer maintained that initial penetration completes the act of intercourse, the Baby court may have provided contrary evidence to Matthew Lyon’s conclusion
that the majority of states adhere to the “common law principle that once consensual intercourse begins, a man cannot be prosecuted for rape even if the woman withdraws her
consent during the act.” See Lyon, supra note 92, at 291.
200. See Baby, 404 Md. at 260, 946 A.2d at 486 (holding that “a woman may withdraw
consent for vaginal intercourse after penetration has occurred and that, after consent has
been withdrawn, the continuation of vaginal intercourse by force or the threat of force may
constitute rape”).
201. See, e.g., McGill, 18 P.3d at 84 (dismissing the reasoning in Way as representing
“archaic and outmoded social conventions”); Siering, 644 A.2d at 963 (rejecting the position in Way as “archaic and unrealistic”); Palmer, supra note 180, at 1259–60 (describing
the legal trend dismissing Way as “rejecting the outdated notions of ‘womanhood’”).
202. See supra Part IV.A–B.
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Instead, the court devoted only a single page of its opinion to this
topic, disregarding several compelling arguments and thus improperly reversing Baby’s two third degree sexual offense convictions. The
Court of Appeals first overlooked the fact that Baby’s two third degree
sexual offense convictions arose from facts entirely separate from
those that substantiated Baby’s first degree rape conviction. At his second trial in December 2004, Baby was convicted on four counts: (1)
first degree rape for being “aided and abetted by [Mike] in the act of
vaginal penetration;” (2) first degree sexual assault for aiding and
abetting “[Mike] in the act of anal penetration;” (3) third degree sexual offense for “touched vagina;” and (4) third degree sexual offense
for “touched breast.”203 The trial court instructed the jury that, to
find Baby guilty of the two third degree sexual offense charges, it must
“find that Baby intentionally touched the victim’s vagina and her
breast against her will and without her consent, while aided and abetted by [Mike] Wilson.”204 The trial instruction thus explained that
the two counts of third degree sexual offense arose from J.L.’s allegations that Baby touched her breast and her vagina after she moved to
the backseat of the vehicle and before Baby left Mike and J.L. alone in
the car.205 Baby completely denied these allegations, claiming that he
had no contact with J.L. prior to leaving Mike and J.L. alone in the
car.206 There was thus no allegation of consent to Baby’s touching.207
The facts serving as the basis for Baby’s first degree rape charge did
not occur until later in the evening, after Mike had exited and Baby
had reentered the car, when Baby and J.L. then engaged in intercourse.208 These events were separated not only in time, but also by
the series of events that transpired between Mike and J.L. after Baby
left the two alone in the automobile.209

203. Baby, 404 Md. at 235, 946 A.2d at 472 (alterations in original).
204. Brief of Petitioner and Appendix at 47, Baby, 404 Md. 220, 946 A.2d 463 (No. 14)
[hereinafter Brief of Petitioner].
205. See Baby, 404 Md. at 226, 946 A.2d at 466–67 (describing J.L.’s version of the events
after she moved to sit between Baby and Mike in the backset of the car).
206. Id. at 229, 946 A.2d at 468.
207. See id. at 226, 946 A.2d at 466–67 (describing J.L.’s account of the events without
any allegation of consent to the touching and explaining that J.L. “told them to stop”); id.
at 229, 946 A.2d at 468 (describing Baby’s complete denial of the events and no allegation
of consent to the touching).
208. See id. at 227–32, 946 A.2d at 467–70 (quoting J.L.’s and Baby’s testimony on the
events that transpired after Baby reentered the car and asked J.L. if he could have sex with
her).
209. See id. at 226, 946 A.2d at 467 (describing the events that occurred after Baby left
Mike and J.L. alone in the car).
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The Court of Appeals also seemingly ignored the fact that, not
only were Baby’s third degree sexual offense convictions based on a
separate set of facts, but also the third degree sexual offense charges
involved distinct elements. To sustain a first degree rape conviction, a
jury must find that the defendant engaged in “vaginal intercourse with
another” through force or threat of force and without the person’s
consent.210 However, a third degree sexual offense conviction does
not require vaginal penetration, but only that the defendant partake
in “sexual contact with another” without that person’s consent.211
Despite acknowledging that the jury’s notes explicitly referred to
rape and did not make any reference, direct or tangential, to the facts
or the elements relating to the third degree sexual offense charges,212
the Court of Appeals relied exclusively on one argument to justify reversing Baby’s two third degree sexual offense convictions. Because
“[l]ack of consent is an element common to both rape and . . . third
degree sexual offense[ ],” the court reasoned that any clarification on
the element of consent could have conceivably affected the jury’s verdict on Baby’s third degree sexual offense charges.213 However, this
argument ignored a crucial fact, which the court acknowledged earlier in the Baby opinion: the jury did not inquire merely about the
element of consent, but about the element of consent in the context
of a post-penetration withdrawal of consent during intercourse.214
In its analysis of whether to reverse Baby’s third degree sexual
offense conviction, the court failed to recall its earlier language
describing the jury’s notes as inquiring “about the effect of a woman
withdrawing consent during vaginal intercourse.”215 Instead, in its examination of this issue, the court made the bald conclusion, without
210. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-303(a)(1) (West 2002 & Supp. 2008).
211. Id. § 3-307(a)(1)(i).
212. See Baby, 404 Md. at 265–66, 946 A.2d at 490 (“It is true that the jury’s instructions
specifically mentioned consent ‘to sex’ and ‘rape,’ and did not specifically mention the
actions for which Baby was convicted on the sexual offense charges, specifically . . . touching J.L.’s breast and vagina without her consent.”).
213. Id. at 266, 946 A.2d at 490.
214. See id. at 263, 946 A.2d at 488 (“In both questions, the jurors inquired about the
effect of a woman withdrawing consent during vaginal intercourse.”). In Baby, the jury
submitted two substantive questions, as the first two of the four notes submitted by the jury
related only to the duration of the jury’s deliberations. See id. at 233, 946 A.2d at 470–71.
The jury’s third note read as the following: “If a female consents to sex initially and, during
the course of the sex act to which she consented, for whatever reason, she changes her
mind and the man continues until climax, does the result constitute rape?” Id. at 233–34,
946 A.2d at 471. The next morning, the jury submitted a fourth note, reading as the
following: “If at any time the woman says stop is that rape?” Id. at 235, 946 A.2d at 472.
215. See id. at 263, 946 A.2d at 488 (noting the jury’s inquiry about withdrawal of consent
during intercourse).
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any analysis or citation, that the jury’s question did not represent
“doubt [only] as to the effect of withdrawal of consent in relation to
intercourse.”216 The Court of Appeals claimed that the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the jury’s questions were not limited only
to the context of sexual intercourse.217 However, the Court of Special
Appeals repeatedly explained in its opinion that the “jury in this case
simply wanted to know if consent could be withdrawn after commencement of the ‘sex act,’ i.e., penetration.”218 Therefore, without adequate justification, the Court of Appeals ignored the compelling
argument that the jury’s inquiries did not relate to the two third degree sexual offense charges because the facts from which the two third
degree sexual offense charges arose did not involve penetration, let
alone post-penetration withdrawal of consent.219
Moreover, by citing only to Dorsey and not to any other case
law,220 the Court of Appeals ignored the body of cases in which Maryland courts have chosen not to reverse all of a petitioner’s convictions
due to an erroneous supplemental instruction, but to reverse only
those convictions affected by the error.221 The Court of Appeals over216. See id. at 265, 946 A.2d at 490.
217. See id. (“Like the Court of Special Appeals, we do not find the State’s argument
persuasive that the jury’s questions only represented doubt as to the effect of withdrawal of
consent in relation to intercourse.”).
218. Baby v. State, 172 Md. App. 588, 607, 916 A.2d 410, 421 (2007) (emphasis added);
see also id. at 605, 916 A.2d at 420 (“The plain meaning of the jury’s words, ‘during the sex
act,’ leads one ineluctably to conclude that the reference was to the act of intercourse.”);
id. at 606, 916 A.2d at 420 (“A fair interpretation of the jury’s question is that it was an
inquiry as to the legal effect of a withdrawal of consent subsequent to penetration, and prior
to climax.”). Without any citation to the lower court’s opinion, the Court of Appeals asserted that the Court of Special Appeals rejected the State’s argument that the jury’s inquiry was limited to the context of sexual intercourse. See Baby, 404 Md. at 265, 946 A.2d at
490. However, the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals did not appear to support this
assertion, that it rejected such an argument by the State; instead, the opinion of the Court
of Special Appeals demonstrated that the court rejected the State’s arguments that the
jury’s notes were ambiguous and that the jury’s questions were “not related to either
party’s theory of the case.” Baby, 172 Md. App. at 606, 916 A.2d at 420; see id. at 605–06,
916 A.2d at 420 (rejecting the State’s argument that the wording of the jury’s notes rendered them ambiguous).
219. See Baby, 404 Md. at 235, 946 A.2d at 472 (identifying the facts that substantiated
the third degree sexual offense convictions); Brief of Petitioner, supra note 204, at 47 (asserting that the jury was “not asking about the law as to [the] third degree sexual
offense[s]”).
220. See Baby, 404 Md. at 266, 946 A.2d at 490 (relying upon the Dorsey standard exclusively to make its decision with respect to the supplemental jury instructions).
221. See, e.g., Brogden v. State, 384 Md. 631, 651 & n.8, 652, 866 A.2d 129, 141 & n.8
(2005) (reversing the petitioner’s handgun conviction, but not the petitioner’s burglary
conviction, because the erroneous supplemental instruction “did not address any of the
elements of the separate burglary charge or the applicable burden of proof as to that
charge”); Malik v. State, 152 Md. App. 305, 336–37, 831 A.2d 1101, 1118–19 (2003) (vacat-
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looked the strong analogy between this case and Brogden v. State222 on
this issue, as, in both Baby and Brogden, the supplemental instructions
and the jury’s inquiries did not address any of the elements of the
separate charges—a separate third degree sexual offense charge in
Baby and a separate burglary charge in Brogden.223 In Brogden, the petitioner, who was convicted of first degree burglary and carrying a handgun, contended that the trial court erred in giving the jury a
supplemental instruction regarding the burden of proof for existence
of a handgun license.224 The Brogden court found that this supplemental jury instruction was erroneous, as no evidence had been admitted on the issue of whether the petitioner possessed a handgun
license and the petitioner did not elect to raise this defense.225 The
Brogden court held that this error was not harmless with regard to the
handgun conviction and thus reversed this conviction.226 However,
the Brogden court affirmed the petitioner’s burglary conviction because the trial court’s supplemental instruction “only addressed the
separate charge of a handgun violation” and did not address the elements of the separate burglary charge.227 Just as the jury’s inquiries in
Brogden regarding handgun licenses did not relate to the elements of
the petitioner’s separate burglary charge, the jury’s inquiries in Baby
addressed only the separate charge of first degree rape.228 Thus, as
the Brogden court found that a further instruction could not have conceivably affected the petitioner’s separate burglary charge,229 the
ing the petitioner’s first degree premeditated murder and conspiracy to commit murder
convictions, but not the petitioner’s other convictions, because the trial court’s error in not
providing a supplemental instruction did not “infect the other convictions”); Morris v.
State, 33 Md. App. 185, 192–93, 364 A.2d 588, 592 (1976) (reversing the petitioner’s assault with intent to murder conviction due to an erroneous instruction by the trial court,
but not the petitioner’s assault and battery convictions, because the assault with intent to
murder conviction “arose out a separate and distinct incident”).
222. 384 Md. 631, 866 A.2d 129.
223. Compare Baby, 404 Md. at 233–35, 946 A.2d at 471–72 (describing the jury’s two
substantive notes and the trial court’s responses), with Brogden, 384 Md. at 651 n.8, 866
A.2d at 141 n.8 (“The supplemental jury instructions at issue in the case at bar did not
address any of the elements of the separate burglary charge or the applicable burden of
proof as to that charge.”).
224. Brogden, 384 Md. at 639, 866 A.2d at 133–34.
225. Id. at 651, 866 A.2d at 140–41.
226. Id. at 651–52, 866 A.2d at 141.
227. Id. at 651–52 n.8, 866 A.2d at 141 n.8.
228. Compare id. (describing the substance of the jury’s inquiries), with Baby, 404 Md. at
233–35, 946 A.2d at 471–72 (same).
229. See Brogden, 384 Md. at 651–52 n.8, 866 A.2d at 141 n.8 (finding that a supplemental instruction could not have conceivably affected the petitioner’s separate burglary
charge because the jury’s inquiry “only addressed the separate charge of a handgun violation” and did not address the elements of the separate burglary charge).
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Court of Appeals should have found that a further instruction on the
issue of post-penetration withdrawal of consent could not have conceivably affected Baby’s separate third degree sexual offense charges.
Under the Dorsey standard, the error in Baby was harmless with
regard to the unrelated third degree sexual offense charges, as there
was no reasonable possibility that the erroneous supplemental jury instruction could have altered the jury’s verdict on Baby’s third degree
sexual offense charges.230 Therefore, the Court of Appeals should
have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that this error “in no way
influenced the verdict” on the two third degree sexual offense convictions231 because these convictions were based on a separate set of facts
that did not involve any intercourse, consent, or post-penetration
withdrawal of consent.232
Through its abrupt decision to reverse Baby’s third degree sexual
offense convictions without addressing the relevant body of Maryland
law,233 the Court of Appeals in Baby provided a perplexing example
for appellate courts. Despite precedent suggesting that Maryland
courts should analyze the effect of an error on each conviction individually, the Court of Appeals conducted only a cursory examination
of the impact of the trial court’s erroneous instruction on Baby’s sexual offense convictions.234 Thus, by reversing all of Baby’s convictions
without acknowledging that his two third degree sexual offense convictions arose from separate facts and involved distinct elements, the
Court of Appeals effectively undermined Maryland case law that traditionally required courts to carefully analyze the effect of an error on
each conviction individually, recognizing that an error may not “infect” unrelated convictions.235
V.

CONCLUSION

By conducting a thorough analysis of whether to reverse Baby’s
rape conviction, the Court of Appeals thwarted any confusion that
had developed as to the significance of its previous statement in Battle
on post-penetration withdrawal of consent.236 The Court of Appeals
230. See Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976) (explaining that, to
find an error was harmless, a reviewing court must “be satisfied that there is no reasonable
possibility that the evidence complained of . . . may have contributed to the rendition of
the guilty verdict”).
231. See id. (explaining the Dorsey standard).
232. See supra notes 203–209 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 203–229 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 221–229 and accompanying text.
236. See supra Part IV.A.
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also firmly declared that Maryland law, in accordance with the weight
of authority, recognizes that forcibly continuing intercourse after a
withdrawal of consent subsequent to penetration constitutes rape.237
With regard to its decision to reverse Baby’s sexual offense convictions, however, the Court of Appeals did not engage in a comparable
analysis, disregarding several compelling arguments, and thus improperly reversed Baby’s two third degree sexual offense convictions.238
The Court of Appeals may have reversed all of Baby’s convictions in
order to emphasize to trial courts the importance of providing a clear
supplemental jury instruction when the jury expresses confusion.239
However, by reversing all of Baby’s convictions, without addressing the
fact that the two third degree sexual offense convictions arose from
separate facts that involved no allegations of penetration and from
distinct elements,240 the court provided a confounding example to
Maryland courts by undermining the previously well-guarded importance of carefully analyzing the effect of an error on each conviction
individually, recognizing that the error may not infect unrelated
convictions.241

237. See supra Part IV.B.
238. See supra Part IV.C.
239. See State v. Baby, 404 Md. 220, 260–64, 946 A.2d 463, 487–89 (2008) (explaining
the importance of clarifying the jury’s confusion and evaluating whether the trial court
successfully did so in this case).
240. See supra notes 203–211 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 221–229, 233–235 and accompanying text.

